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Comments
License to Discriminate: A Rule for
Protecting Limited English Proficient
Persons from National Origin
Discrimination by State Departments
of Motor Vehicles
Brandon T. Lozeau*

“Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all
taxpayers of all races [colors, and national origins]
contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages,
entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial [color or national
origin] discrimination.”
President John F. Kennedy1
INTRODUCTION

In 1963, President John F. Kennedy advocated for Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), declaring: “Direct
discrimination by Federal, State[,] or local governments is
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2021;
M.A., University of Kent–Brussels School of International Studies; B.A.,
University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth. I would like to thank Professor
Jonathan Gutoff for being my advisor, as well as Nicole Shaw Richards for
providing valuable edits. Thank you to my friends and family for the love and
support.
1. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job
Opportunities, 1963 PUB. PAPERS 483, 492 (June 19, 1963).
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prohibited by the Constitution. But indirect discrimination,
through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious . . . .” 2 The
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) explains that Title VI
was first proposed as a means of addressing “the then-common
practice of denying certain persons access to federally funded
services, programs, and activities based on their race, color, or
national origin.”3 Indeed, calling out and correcting invidious
discrimination, and ensuring it does not infiltrate federally funded
and assisted programs and activities is the ultimate goal of Title VI
and its implementing regulations.4
As of 2017, about sixty-seven million residents of the United
States speak a language other than English at home, which is up
more than seven million since 2010. 5 Further, almost forty
percent6 of those who speak a language other than English at
home—roughly twenty-six million people—informed the United
States Census Bureau that they speak English “less than very
well.”7 According to the American Community Survey, published
in 2015, approximately seven million California residents
responded that they do not speak English well, while the same was
true for about three-hundred thousand residents in Michigan and
roughly eighty-six thousand residents in Rhode Island.8 Vast
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 2 (2016),
https://www.masslegalservices.org/system/files/library/title_vi_legal_manual_
intro_sections_9-21-16-pdf_versionbookmarks_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TETB5MT].
4. See id.
5. Karen Zeigler & Steven A. Camarota, Almost Half Speak a Foreign
Language in America’s Largest Cities, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Sept. 19, 2018),
https://cis.org/Report/Almost-Half-Speak-Foreign-Language-AmericasLargest-Cities [https://perma.cc/239V-DR5P].
States with the largest
increases from 2010 to 2017 were “Wyoming (up [thirty-three] percent); North
Dakota (up [thirty] percent); Utah (up [twenty-five] percent); Delaware (up
[twenty-four] percent); Nevada (up [twenty-two] percent); Maryland,
Nebraska, Kentucky, and Florida (each up [twenty-one] percent); and
Minnesota (up [nineteen] percent).” Id.
6. Zeigler and Camarota indicate that this figure is solely based on the
respondents’ opinions of their own English language skills and that the U.S.
Census Bureau does not measure language skills. Id.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DETAILED LANGUAGES SPOKEN AT HOME AND
ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE POPULATION 5 YEARS AND OVER: 2009–2013
(2015). According to the 2015 American Community Survey, roughly 19.4% of
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segments of the population of the United States must be able to
access federally funded and assisted programs in languages other
than English in order to participate fully and benefit equally from
those programs. To exclude millions of people from government
funded programs because they do not speak English equates to
widespread and systemic discrimination based on national origin.
If federally funded and assisted programs are not offered in
languages other than English, then limited English proficient (LEP)
persons9 are essentially denied meaningful access and a recipient10 of
federal funds may be found to be in violation of Title VI. This is
because language can be seen as a proxy for national origin as
individuals are inherently limited in their English proficiency “as a
result of national origin.”11 When a recipient accepts funds from the
federal government, the recipient also “accepts the obligations that go
along with it, namely, the obligation not to exclude from participation,
deny benefits to, or subject to discrimination an otherwise qualified”
LEP person based solely on their language (i.e., national origin).12
Under Title VI, a recipient enters into a contractual arrangement
whereby the recipient agrees to comply with the statute’s
nondiscrimination provisions as a condition of receiving federal
financial assistance.13 The only way a recipient could avoid this
Californians, 3.2% of Michiganders, and 8.7% of Rhode Islanders self-identified
as unable to speak English well. See id.
9. The federal government defines LEP persons as those “[i]ndividuals
who do not speak English as their primary language and who have a limited
ability to read, speak, write, or understand English.” Policy Guidance
Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited English Proficient (LEP)
Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,091 (Dec. 14, 2005). The data identifies people
who speak a different language “but speak or understand English less than
well.” Id. at 74092 n.7.
10. For the purposes of Title VI and this Comment, “recipient” means “any
State, political subdivision of any State, or instrumentality of any State or
political subdivision, any public or private agency, institution, or organization,
or other entity, or any individual, in any State, to whom Federal financial
assistance is extended, directly or through another recipient, for any program,
including any successor, assign, or transferee thereof, but such term does not
include any ultimate beneficiary.” 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(f) (2003).
11. Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
12. See Chester v. Univ. of Wash., No. C11-5937, 2012 WL 3599351, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 21, 2012) (recipient of federal funds could not discriminate
against “otherwise qualified handicapped individual based solely by reason of
her handicap.”).
13. U.S. Dep’t. of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986).
See 28 C.F.R. § 42.105 (2003).
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obligation would be to decline federal funds altogether. 14 Thus, if a
recipient is found to be in violation of Title VI it risks losing federal
funds unless the recipient takes affirmative steps to rectify the
discrimination.15
Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”16
Therefore, LEP individuals have a right to meaningful access and
should be able to participate in and benefit from federally funded and
assisted programs and activities to the same degree as their Englishspeaking neighbors. However, many LEP persons17 find it difficult to
access these services because of language barriers and inadequate
language accommodations. Although LEP persons regularly
experience difficulties, meaningful access is a critical issue when the
services in question are essential to everyday life, such as those
provided by a state’s department of motor vehicles (DMV). For
example, if a DMV offers driver’s license examinations and state
identification card (ID) applications only in English, then LEP persons
may be unable obtain a driver’s license or state ID. As recipients of
federal financial assistance,18 DMVs have an undeniable obligation to
provide LEP persons meaningful access to their services. 19

14. Chester, 2012 WL 3599351, at *4.
15. 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(b). “If an applicant or recipient fails or refuses . . .
to comply with any requirement imposed by or pursuant to [T]itle VI or this
subpart, Federal financial assistance may be suspended, terminated, or
refused in accordance with the procedures of [T]itle VI and this subpart.” Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
17. In this Comment, the term “LEP persons” does not include those
individuals who may be living in the United States undocumented. However,
it should be noted that undocumented LEP persons are covered by Title VI.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–11 (1982) (undocumented individuals are
considered “persons” when it comes to the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
18. According to the United States Department of Transportation’s
regulations, “[f]ederal financial assistance includes grants, cooperative
agreements, training, use of equipment, donations of surplus property, and
other assistance.” Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to
Limited English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,091 (Dec.
14, 2005).
19. Id. (listing state departments of transportation and state motor
vehicle administrations as recipients of federal financial assistance).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that individuals do not
have a private cause of action under Title VI for disparate impact
discrimination.20 Further, the Supreme Court has not clearly defined
the requisite intent for disparate treatment claims, therefore, every
state should enhance discrimination protections for LEP persons
seeking DMV services by adopting a “minimum threshold” rule that
would: (1) guarantee LEP persons consistent meaningful access to
DMV services as the state is the primary provider of important
services; (2) help states foresee DMV service disruptions to LEP
communities and take proactive measures to prevent such disruptions
before they happen; (3) reduce administrative and budgetary burdens
through improved planning and a reduction in interpreter and
litigation expenses; and (4) provide greater certainty as to which DMV
services are readily available in languages other than English for LEP
customers.21 This minimum threshold rule would require state DMVs
to provide all services and materials in languages spoken by an
established threshold percentage of the population.22 Each state
would enforce the rule and it would provide LEP persons with a private
cause of action in state courts. In addition, LEP persons subject to
discrimination would be able to file a formal complaint with the federal
government and possibly litigate a Title VI claim for intentional
discrimination based on national origin.23
This Comment will first explore three critical Supreme Court
decisions that shaped Title VI’s application and individuals’ private
right of action for disparate impact discrimination under the statute.

20. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281, 289−93 (2001);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 282–84 (1978) (Powell, J.,
plurality).
21. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 321C-3 (2012) (state health agencies and
covered entities must provide written translations of vital documents to each
LEP group that “constitutes five percent or one thousand, whichever is less, of
the population of persons eligible to be served or likely to be affected or
encountered” by the service, program, or activity).
22. States’ rules should include a provision where the minimum threshold
is either a specific percentage of the population or a minimum number of
individuals, whichever is less, who are “eligible to be served or likely to be
affected or encountered” by the DMVs’ services, programs, or activities to
ensure maximum coverage. See id.
23. Because there is not a private cause of action for disparate impact
discrimination under Title VI, individuals’ complaints must be filed with the
federal agency or department from which the recipient receives Federal
financial assistance and any litigation would be brought forward by the agency
on behalf of the complainant. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 289–93.
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In Lau v. Nichols, the Supreme Court held that Title VI allowed
individuals to properly sue a recipient of federal funding for both
intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination.24
Later, the Supreme Court narrowed Title VI’s scope in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, finding that Section 601 of the
statute proscribed only intentional discrimination. 25 In 2001, the
Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Sandoval that if regulations
promulgated under Section 60226 of Title VI prohibit disparate impact
discrimination, individuals cannot sue to enforce those regulations
because Section 601 of Title VI forbids only intentional discrimination
as the Court decided in Bakke.27

Post-Sandoval, the Supreme Court has offered little direction
as to exactly what sort of evidence a plaintiff must proffer to
constitute the requisite “intent” for a disparate treatment claim
under Title VI. This Comment will survey standards and factors
set out in subsequent district court and circuit court opinions, as
well as incorporate the DOJ’s Executive Order (EO) 13166
implementation guidance, to show—in the wake of Bakke and
Sandoval—that one may still be able to show intent when a DMV’s
facially neutral policies and procedures fail to provide meaningful
access for LEP persons. Finally, this Comment will advocate that
states adopt a minimum threshold rule to guarantee meaningful
access for LEP persons as required by law, lessen states’ civil rights
complaints and potential litigation, and prevent federal tax dollars

24. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974).
25. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318–19 (Powell, J., plurality); see also Sandoval,
532 U.S. at 281 (reinforcing that Bakke stood for the proposition that “Title VI
itself reaches only instances of intentional discrimination.” (quoting Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985))).
26. Section 602 of Title VI, in pertinent part, states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty,
is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d
of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the
action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
27. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
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from being used to discriminate against anyone based on race, color,
or national origin at state DMVs.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Original Purpose and Scope of Title VI
There are several important civil rights laws and regulations
that are meant to protect individuals from discrimination,
including Title VI. Specifically, Section 601 of the statute provides
that no person shall, “on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity”
receiving federal financial assistance.28 The phrase “program or
activity” includes the operations of “a department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or a local
government.”29 The DOJ’s Title VI regulations provide in pertinent
part:
A recipient . . . may not, directly or through contractual or
other arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting
individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of
the program as respects individuals of a particular race,
color, or national origin.30
While Congress passed Title VI initially out of concern for
public school desegregation, the statute includes “every other area
of federal concern, from agriculture to transportation.”31 Section
602 of the statute authorized and directed all federal departments
and agencies that provide federal financial assistance to any
program or activity32 “to effectuate the provisions of [S]ection 601

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2008).
29. Id. § 2000d–4a(1)(A).
30. 28 C.F.R § 42.104(b)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
31. Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory
Model for Defining “Discrimination,” 70 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1981).
32. Under Title VI, federal financial assistance could be in the form of a
“grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000d–1.
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with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability . . . consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.”33
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens supported this
construction, arguing Section 602 “exists for the sole purpose of
promoting the antidiscrimination ideals laid out in [Section] 601.”34
Later, President William J. Clinton signed EO 13166, which sought
to “improve access to federally conducted and federally assisted
programs and activities for persons who, as a result of national
origin, are limited in their English proficiency (LEP).”35
Title VI is an important and effective tool—independent of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 36—in the fight
against invidious discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin.37 In a comprehensive review of Title VI’s legislative history
and its subsequent revisions, Professor Charles Abernathy found
that the 88th United States Congress “neither intended to mimic
the Constitution’s [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause nor to create a new
rigid standard.”38 As part of a complicated legislative compromise,
Congress embraced “a regulatory model for [T]itle VI that invested
federal departments and agencies with the power to define the
discrimination forbidden by [T]itle VI.” 39 Rather than adopting the
Supreme Court’s effects test or intent test, Congress “authorized
agencies to make the choice through regulations.” 40 Although, as

33. Id.
34. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 304 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
35. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
36. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. EO 13166 is more bark than bite because Section 5 provides that “[t]his
order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive
branch and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies,
its officers or employees, or any person.” Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 50,121.
38. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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Professor Bradford Mank noted, the Supreme Court’s cases that
help interpret Title VI are “complex and not easy to summarize.” 41
In its first Title VI case, Lau v. Nichols, in 1974, a unanimous
Supreme Court adopted the effects test and held that recipients of
federal financial assistance may not use “criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination” or those that have “the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the
program [with] respect [to] individuals of a particular race, color, or
national origin.”42 Under Lau, recipients that utilize such “criteria
or methods of administration” could be held in violation of Title VI
not only for intentional discrimination but also disparate impact
discrimination. 43 However, the Supreme Court in 1978
significantly curtailed Title VI’s application in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.44 There, a fractured bench45
strongly suggested proof of intentional discrimination was required
to establish that a recipient had violated Title VI.46 While Bakke
did not invalidate Lau’s effects test, the Supreme Court took a
significant step towards eliminating individuals’ right to sue for
disparate impact discrimination under the statute. 47
Despite the Bakke decision, federal agencies were still allowed
to adopt regulations under Section 602 that would prohibit
disparate impact discrimination.48 The Title VI landscape was
completely altered in Alexander v. Sandoval when the Supreme
Court held that private parties could no longer sue to enforce
41. Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?,
71 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 517, 517 (2003).
42. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 565, 568 (1974) (quoting 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(2)).
43. Id. at 567–68.
44. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280-81 (2001) (explaining that
Bakke’s limitation of Title VI discrimination to that under the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rendered disparate impact
discrimination outside of the scope of the statute).
45. In Bakke, nine justices issued a total of six opinions: Justice Powell
wrote the judgment and two different blocs composed of four justices each
joined various parts of Powell’s opinion. See generally Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1973).
46. See id. at 318–19; Mank, supra note 41, at 522.
47. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-19.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1.
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regulations promulgated under Section 602 that include types of
discrimination not covered under Section 601, namely disparate
impact discrimination.49 Following Sandoval, private causes of
action for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI are not
justiciable. 50
B. Providing Meaningful Access Under Title VI and Executive
Order 13166
EO 13166 directed the DOJ to develop implementation
guidance for recipients funded through the department’s
programs.51 The DOJ published its guidance in 2002 and it
subsequently became the model for all federal departments and
agencies.52 The guidance suggests recipients consider four factors
when they develop policies to provide meaningful access for LEP
persons:
(1) The number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be
served or likely to be encountered by the program or
grantee; (2) the frequency with which LEP [persons] come
in contact with the program; (3) the nature and importance
of the program, activity, or service provided by the program
to people’s lives; and (4) the resources available to the
grantee/recipient and costs.53
The DOJ emphasized that the intent of the above guidance was to
“suggest a balance that ensures meaningful access by LEP persons
to critical services while not imposing undue burdens on small
business, local government, or small nonprofits.”54 The DOJ
implicitly recognized that state-government departments and
49. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 292.
50. Id. Individuals can lodge Title VI disparate impact discrimination
claims with federal funding agencies through an administrative process. See,
e.g., File a Title VI Complaint with the FRA, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://railroads.dot.gov/resource-center/title-vi-civil-rights-act-1964/file-titlevi-complaint-fra [https://perma.cc/4L68-VBGM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
51. See Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
52. See Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg.
41,455, 41,455 (June 18, 2002).
53. Id. at 41,459.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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agencies could shoulder a greater burden than small businesses,
local government, or small nonprofits, and could make the
investments necessary to provide meaningful access in compliance
with Title VI.55
1. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of Title VI in Lau v.
Nichols Protected LEP Persons from Disparate Impact
Discrimination
In Lau, representatives of nearly two thousand “non-Englishspeaking students of Chinese ancestry” claimed that San Francisco
school officials failed to provide instruction on par with instruction
given to the students’ English-speaking peers, denying thousands
of non-English-speaking students a meaningful education in
violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VI.56 Lower courts held that the school officials did not
intentionally discriminate against the students because the city
provided the plaintiffs with the same educational opportunities
afforded to all other students 57 and any inequality in educational
outcomes was the result of the plaintiffs’ own “advantages and
disadvantages” they “[brought] to the starting line of [their]
educational career[s].”58
The Supreme Court overturned the court of appeals, reasoning
that because school attendance in California was compulsory and
students were required to demonstrate English proficiency in order
to graduate, there was “no equality of treatment” since the
plaintiffs were “effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education.”59 Using an “effects test,” the Supreme Court found that
violations under Title VI included any action that had the effect of
discrimination to “national-origin minorities.”60 This meant that
individuals subjected to “disparate impact” discrimination 61 based
55. See id.
56. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564 (1974).
57. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 16.
58. Id. (quoting Lau, 493 F.2d at 797).
59. Lau, 414 U.S. at 566; Abernathy, supra note 31, at 16.
60. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 17.
61. “Disparate impact discrimination” is discrimination resulting from
policies, practices, or rules that may be neutral on the surface, but have a
disproportionate impact on a protected group of people. What are Disparate
Impact and Disparate Treatment?, SOC’Y OF HUMAN RES. MANAGERS,
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on race, color, or national origin may sue a recipient under Title
VI.62 The Lau Court “clearly considered [T]itle VI to be more than
simply a remedy for equal protection violations.” 63 If Title VI were
only a remedy for equal protection violations, there would not have
been much of a reason to include the title in the Civil Rights Act in
the first place. Professor Abernathy argued that “[t]he Court in Lau
relied on the statute, and its underlying regulations, to define a
violation as any action that has the ‘effect’ of denying educational
opportunities to national-origin minorities.”64 The regulations in
question “forbade funding recipients to take actions that had the
effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national
origin.”65 Correctly, the Court proclaimed that Title VI prohibited
disparate impact discrimination because “[d]iscrimination is barred
which has the effect even though no purposeful design is present.”66
C. The Supreme Court Questions Lau and Title VI’s Scope
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of the
City of New York, Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall
pointed out that Congress did not define the term “discrimination”
in the statute, arguing Congress deliberately chose not to do so in
order to grant federal agencies the flexibility to define the word’s
meaning in a way most suitable to their individual needs. 67 At the
time, Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the statute allowed for a
private cause of action for both intentional and disparate impact
discrimination. 68 Indeed, even the late Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia argued that courts “should refuse to consider a
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hrqa/pages/disparateimpactdisparatetreatment.aspx
[https://perma.cc/KP53B7EQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
62. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 17.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Lau, 414 U.S. at 566, 568) (emphasis added).
65. Mank, supra note 41, at 521 (emphasis added).
66. Lau, 414 U.S at 568. See also Mank, supra note 41, at 521. Professor
Mank underlined the Court’s stance in Lau, noting that “[t]he Court stated
that the [S]ection 602 disparate impact regulations simply ‘[made] sure that
recipients of federal aid . . . conduct[ed] any federally financed projects
consistently with [Section] 601.’” Id. (quoting Lau, 414 U.S. at 570).
67. Mank, supra note 41, at 529 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463 U.S 582, 622–23 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
68. Id.
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statute’s legislative history because it is the text alone that is
enacted by Congress and presented to the President for his
signature or veto.”69 A textualist approach would lead one to
believe that because the statute does not prohibit only intentional
discrimination, then the statute proscribes both intentional
discrimination and disparate impact discrimination because both
fall within the plain meaning of discrimination as it is written in
Title VI. 70 As Justice Stevens explained in Sandoval, “[Section] 602
explicitly states . . . agencies are authorized to ‘effectuate’ [Section]
601’s antidiscrimination mandate,” arguing that “[t]he plain
meaning of the text reveals Congress’ intent to provide the relevant
agencies with sufficient authority to transform the statute’s broad
aspiration into social reality.” 71
While Bakke did not overrule Lau, the Supreme Court openly
questioned the fundamental result of Lau’s holding and expressed
“serious doubts concerning correctness of what appear[ed] to be the
premise of [the Lau] decision.”72 In Bakke, the respondent alleged
the University of California at Davis admissions program73 violated
69. Id. at 530 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99
(1991); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–77 (2001)).
70. Id.
71. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 305–06 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1). This Comment will not address the
“Chevron doctrine,” a well-established principle of administrative law, which
provides that “when the agencies charged with administering a broadly worded
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete guidance
as to its implementation, [the Court] treat[s] their interpretation of the
statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable
construction of the statutory text.” Id. at 309.
72. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 352 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. The medical school’s admissions program in 1973 allowed candidates
to indicate on their applications whether they wanted to be considered as
“economically and/or educationally disadvantaged.” Id. at 274 (Powell, J.,
plurality). On the 1974 version of the medical school’s application, the school
asked applicants if they wanted to be considered as part of a “minority group,”
that is, whether the student was “black,” “Chicano,” “Asian,” or “American
Indian.” Students that indicated they were a member of a minority group were
then separated out and went through a similar admissions procedure to nonminority students, except that they were not required to meet the minimum
2.5 grade point average threshold applied to non-minority applicants. Id.
While many white disadvantaged students applied through the special
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the California Constitution, Title VI, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it considered race
in the school’s admissions decisions.74 While the University’s
admissions procedures led to an increase in enrollment of Black,
Mexican-American, Asian, and American Indian students, the
school’s special admissions program for “disadvantaged” applicants
did not accept any white students even when white applicants
qualified as “disadvantaged.”75 Respondent Allan Bakke had a
strong application,76 but the medical school rejected him while four
slots remained available through the special admissions program,
slots for which he was not considered.77 As a result, Bakke claimed
the special admissions program effectively excluded him from the
medical school on the basis of race.78
The Supreme Court then suggested the constitutional
standards of the Equal Protection Clause were also applicable to
Title VI. 79 Writing for the majority, Supreme Court Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., opined that Title VI prohibited only those racial
admissions program, none were considered for places as the special admissions
committee only considered special applicants that were members of one of the
above minority groups. Id. at 276.
74. Id. at 269–70.
75. Id. at 275–76. While the University did not explicitly define the term
“disadvantaged” in its admissions procedures, each application submitted via
the special admissions program was reviewed to see if it “reflected economic or
educational deprivation.” Id. at 274–75.
76. In both years in which Bakke’s application was rejected, he scored
higher on the MCAT, had a better grade point average, and received a higher
benchmark admission score than several applicants admitted under the special
admissions program. Id. at 277.
77. Id. at 276.
78. Id. at 277–78.
79. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 2 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell,
J., plurality) (Title VI prohibits only state actions that would violate the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause));
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325, 352 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (Title VI meaning of discrimination mirrors its meaning in Constitutional
context). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
only intentional discrimination, which can occur in any of three ways: (1) a law
or policy may explicitly classify citizens on the basis of a protected category; (2)
a facially neutral law or policy may be applied differently on the basis of
membership in a protected category; or (3) a facially neutral law or policy may
be applied evenhandedly but motivated by discriminatory intent. Faith Action
for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 751134 at *5 (D.
Haw. Feb. 23, 2015).
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classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the
Fifth Amendment, finding that legislative intent was clear in that
Title VI gave no rights other than those guaranteed by the
Constitution.80 However, the Supreme Court ultimately decided
not to address whether Title VI granted a private cause of action
for disparate impact discrimination because the issue was neither
argued nor decided in the lower courts.81 Thus, the question
remained unresolved until Alexander v. Sandoval.82
D. Sandoval Significantly Curtailed Title VI’s Scope, Limiting
Private Individuals’ Right to Action to Only Instances of
Intentional Discrimination
In a contentious five–four decision issued on April 24, 2001, the
Supreme Court further restricted Title VI’s effectiveness and
severely limited communities’ ability to fight invidious
discrimination. 83 Martha Sandoval, individually and on behalf of
all others similarly situated, brought a class action suit against the
State of Alabama.84 Sandoval asserted that the State’s policy of
administering driver’s license examinations only in English85 had
a discriminatory impact on non-English speakers based on their
national origin, which Sandoval claimed violated her rights under
Title VI. 86 Both the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit rejected Alabama’s argument that Title VI did not
give Sandoval a cause of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Section 602.87 However, the
Supreme Court held that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as
80. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287 (Powell, J., plurality).
81. Id. at 283.
82. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 279.
85. In 1990, the State of Alabama amended its constitution to declare that
English was the state’s official language—pursuant to its newly amended
constitution, the Alabama Department of Public Safety decided to administer
state driver’s license exams only in English. Id. at 278–79 (citing ALA. CONST.
amend. 509 (1990)).
86. Id. at 279.
87. Id.; see Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 511 (11th Cir. 1999); see also
Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1273 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
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later amended [did] Title VI display an intent to create a
freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations
promulgated under [Section] 602.”88 Thus, Sandoval did not have
a private cause of action absent proof of intentional discrimination.
Invoking prior Title VI decisions, Justice Scalia emphasized
that “the Court made clear under Bakke only intentional
discrimination was forbidden by [Section] 601,” 89 and reaffirmed
the Court’s previous holding that “Title VI itself directly reaches
only instances of intentional discrimination.”90 Sandoval found
that it was “clear now that the disparate-impact regulations do not
simply apply [Section] 601—since they indeed forbid conduct that
[Section] 601 permits—and therefore clear that the private right of
action to enforce [Section] 601 does not include a private right to
enforce these regulations.”91 Sandoval finally put to rest the
question of whether Title VI conferred a private cause of action to
enforce disparate impact regulations under Section 602. 92 Justice
Scalia concluded that Section 602 did not confer a private cause of
action to enforce disparate impact regulations because “a failure to
comply with regulations promulgated under Section 602 that is not
also a failure to comply with Section 601 is not actionable.”93 The
Supreme Court further opined that Section 602 did not create new
rights, but merely limited federal agencies to “effectuating” those
rights already created under Section 601.94
Justice Scalia
highlighted a lack of evidence “anywhere in the text to suggest that
Congress intended to create a private right to enforce regulations
promulgated under [Section] 602.”95 However, this textualist
88. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293.
89. Id. at 281 (citing Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C., 463
U.S. 582, 610–11 (1983)).
90. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (internal
quotes omitted)).
91. Id. at 285–86 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994) (a “private plaintiff may not
bring a [suit based on a regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited
by the text of [the statute]”)).
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id. The Court also noted that “[l]ike substantive federal law itself,
private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”
Id. (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
94. Id. at 289.
95. Id. at 291.
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argument works both ways as there is also no evidence anywhere
in Title VI that Congress intended to exclude disparate impact from
the discrimination described in Section 601. 96
Arguing stare decisis,97 Justice Stevens pointed out in his
dissent that “[w]hen this Court faced an identical case [twentyseven] years ago, all the Justices believed that private parties could
bring lawsuits under Title VI and its implementing regulations to
enjoin the provision of governmental services in a manner that
discriminated against non-English speakers.”98 Comparing Title
VI to its “gender-based twin,” Title IX, Justice Stevens highlighted
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,
where the Court looked at Title VI and Title IX side by side and
“examined the text of the statutes, analyzed the purpose of the
laws, and canvassed the relevant legislative history,”99 concluding
that there was “no doubt that Congress intended to create Title IX
remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it
understood Title VI as authorizing an implied private cause of
action for victims of the prohibited discrimination.”100 In addition,
Justice Stevens concluded that one must assume Congress was
“fully informed as to the state of the law” and would have indicated
its intention to limit Title VI to only intentional discrimination
because it was not Congress’ first time writing legislation and
Congress would have included language limiting Title VI to only
intentional discrimination if that was its legislative intent.101
Indeed, Title VI went through a rigorous legislative process that
offered many opportunities to make such a change before the
96. Section 601 simply states that “No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1964).
97. Justice Stevens argued that he would have affirmed “the decision of
the Court of Appeals as a matter of stare decisis.” Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 302
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (emphasis in the original).
98. Id. at 296 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart explained in Lau that
regulations promulgated under section 602 may “go beyond . . . [Section] 601”
provided that they are “reasonably related” to section 601’s antidiscrimination
mandate. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring).
99. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 297.
100. Id. (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979)).
101. Id. at 314.

140 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:123
statute passed both the United States House of Representatives
and the Senate.102
As Professor Mank pointed out, even if private plaintiffs may
no longer enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations through a
private cause of action, the Supreme Court at some point must
consider “whether federal agencies may invoke penalties or
terminate funding to recipients because of a finding of disparate
impact discrimination.”103 Professor Mank argued that “[e]very
significant federal agency has disparate impact regulations
pursuant to [S]ection 602 of Title VI,” and that inevitably a
recipient “will appeal an adverse decision by a federal agency using
disparate impact regulations and courts will have to address the
issue.”104
E. Determining “Intent” Under a Post-Sandoval Scheme
Sandoval
requires
plaintiffs
to
prove
intentional
discrimination in Title VI claims, 105 however, the Supreme Court
did not provide much additional guidance or factors for how lower
courts should assess whether or not an official action that results
in discrimination based on a person’s race, color, or national origin
rises to the requisite level of intent for a plaintiff to succeed in a
private cause of action. 106 However, subsequent cases in district
courts in Hawaii, New Jersey, Ohio, and the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals,107 paired with guidance from the DOJ, are instructive and
collectively provide some useful tests for future Title VI claims. 108
102. See id.
103. Mank, supra note 41, at 540. Professor Mank also pointed out,
“[p]ursuant to [S]ection 602 of Title VI, federal agencies must investigate
complaints of discrimination and may impose sanctions if there is evidence of
discriminatory impacts.” Id. at n.155 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1).
104. Id.
105. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279.
106. S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254 F. Supp.
2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003).
107. See Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548 (3rd Cir. 2002); Faith Action for
Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 751134 at *1 (D.
Haw. Feb. 23, 2015); Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799 (N.D. Ohio
2003).
108. It is worth noting that the DOJ’s guidance for federal funding
recipients on how to provide meaningful access for LEP persons was published
in 2002 (after Sandoval) and serves as the model for all federal departments
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Even absent a cause of action for disparate impact under either the
Equal Protection Clause or Title VI, the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii in Faith Action for Community
Equity v. Hawaii (FACE) stressed that “disparate impact ‘is not
irrelevant’ to a claim of intentional discrimination.”109
Post-Sandoval, at least one federal district court has found that
a recipient’s agreement to administer a federally-assisted program
and subsequent failure to provide services in accordance with Title
VI’s nondiscrimination provisions were enough to defeat a motion
for judgment on the pleadings.110 In Almendares v. Palmer, the
Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) and the
Lucas County Department of Job and Family Services (LCDJFS)
accepted federal funding for the county’s food stamp program, and,
therefore, agreed to administer the program in accordance with the
Food Stamp Act (FSA) and Title VI.111 The plaintiffs in Almendares
were “low-income Spanish-speaking persons” who contended that
“notices, applications, and written communications from ODJFS
and LCDJFS [were] almost exclusively in English,” and that
LCDJFS “[did] not have employees available who [were] able to
speak to plaintiffs in Spanish.”112 The plaintiffs asserted that
defendants effectively denied them their right to “participate
equally in the federal food stamp program.” 113 The plaintiffs
alleged that the ODJFS and LCDJFS failed to conduct the program
in accordance with the FSA and Title VI “by using criteria or
methods of program administration that intentionally
discriminate[d] on the basis of national origin.”114
and agencies. See generally Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg.
41,455 (June 18, 2002).
109. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136,
at *15 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)).
110. See Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
111. Id. at 802. “Title VI excludes from participation in federal assistance
recipients of aid that discriminate against racial groups. The ODJFS and
LCDJFS accept[ed] federal funding from the United States Department of
Agriculture and are therefore subject to the restrictions of Title VI.” Id.
112. Id. at 800.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 801.
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The ODJFS and LCDJFS argued that the Supreme Court in
Bakke and Sandoval made it clear that in order to state a claim
under Title VI, “a private individual must allege intentional
discrimination, not disparate impact.” 115 However, United States
District Judge James G. Carr concluded that the plaintiffs’
complaint successfully alleged the “essential elements of a Title VI
claim” based on national origin.116 Judge Carr found that “[t]he
existence of the mandate [FSA and its regulations requiring
bilingual services] and the defendants’ alleged knowing and longterm noncompliance show[ed], arguably, an intent to treat Spanishspeaking recipients of food stamps differently than Englishspeaking recipients.”117 He concluded that “Spanish-speakers [did]
not have the same access to food stamps as English-speakers
[did].”118 The judge also observed that “since Sandoval, there is no
clear precedent as to what a plaintiff must allege to present a claim
for intentional discrimination” under Title VI.119
Even without much case law after Sandoval, it remains that
“[c]laims of intentional discrimination can be based on facially
neutral laws or practices.”120
An assessment of whether
115. Id. at 803 (“Section 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination.”
(citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 (2001))).
116. Id. Judge Carr referenced his response to the State’s argument in their
previous motion to dismiss that the plaintiffs must have alleged that the
defendants intentionally treated similarly situated persons differently on the
basis of national origin. Id. at 803. There, he stated that:
Plaintiffs’ complaint, however, allege[d] that they [were] being treated
differently. Plaintiffs allege[d] that they [were] being discriminated
against on the basis of their Spanish language—thus, their ethnic
origin—due to the failure to implement programs mandated by federal
law. The existence of the mandate and the defendants’ alleged
knowing and long-term noncompliance show[ed], arguably, an intent
to treat Spanish-speaking recipients of food stamps differently than
English-speaking recipients.
Id. at 803 (quoting Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00CV7524, 2002 WL
31730963, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 3, 2002)).
117. Id. at 804 (quoting Almendares, 2002 WL 31730963, at *10).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 805 (“As we made clear in Washington v. Davis . . . and Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. . . . even if a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a
discriminatory purpose.” (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
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discrimination is intentional or unintentional may still begin with
a close look at the “impact of the official action” as an “important
starting point,”121 since the impact of an official action or policy is
often indicative of the reasons why an action or policy was first
created.122 In another post-Sandoval decision, the Third Circuit
reversed a Pennsylvania district court decision, holding that a class
of African-American student athletes sufficiently stated a claim for
intentional discrimination because the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) “knew—via various studies and reports—that
the heightened academic requirements” in the association’s newly
adopted scholarship and athletic eligibility criteria would “reduce
the percentage of black athletes who could qualify for athletic
scholarships.”123 The Third Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs’
argument on their theory of “deliberate indifference,” but found
that the plaintiffs could potentially prove the NCAA’s
discrimination was intentional and remanded the matter for
further proceedings.124

256, 272 (1979))). In Feeney, the Supreme Court held that in order to prove
intentional discrimination by a facially neutral policy, a “plaintiff must show
that the rule was promulgated or reaffirmed because of, not merely in spite of,
its adverse impact on persons in the plaintiff’s class.” Id. (quoting Feeney, 442
U.S. at 279).
121. Id. (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266). In Arlington Heights,
the Supreme Court stated:
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The
impact of the official action—whether it “bears more heavily on one
race than another,”—may provide an important starting point.
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race,
emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
122. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 487 (1997) (“[T]he
impact of an official action is often probative of why the action was taken in
the first place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their
actions.”).
123. Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 564 (3d Cir. 2002).
124. Id. at 570. Judge Michel wrote: “[A]s Plaintiffs suggest, [Proposition
16] is void on its face provided Plaintiffs can establish that the NCAA adopted
Proposition 16 (and, thus, the condition contained in the Plaintiffs’ [National
Letters of Intent]) for the purpose of intentionally discriminating on the basis
of race.” Id.
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In Pryor, Circuit Judge Paul R. Michel accused the plaintiffs of
attempting “to sidestep [Sandoval] by claiming that the NCAA was
not just indifferent to Proposition 16’s alleged disparate impact on
black athletes” but that the defendant was “extremely indifferent
to that impact even if it did not intend to discriminate.” 125 Judge
Michel saw “no meaningful difference between the proffered
‘deliberate indifference’ standard and the rule, well settled by the
Supreme Court, that a [decision maker] will not commit purposeful
discrimination if it adopts a facially neutral policy ‘in spite of’ its
impact, not ‘because of’ that impact.”126 Judge Michel concluded
that the plaintiffs’ substitution of intentional discrimination for
deliberate indifference would “eviscerate the Supreme Court’s
ruling in [Sandoval].” 127 Therefore, the district court rejected the
plaintiffs’ “deliberate indifference” standard as a theory of relief
under Title VI.128
If decision makers’ policies and procedures result in
unintended discriminatory effects, then the recipient would likely
take corrective steps once the discriminatory impact is apparent.
Decision makers could either amend or replace the policies or
choose to leave the policies intact and allow the discriminatory
effects to continue. A deliberate choice to leave discriminatory
policies intact despite their effects could not, by definition, be
considered unintentional.129 The discriminatory impact—which
may have been unintentional initially—clearly becomes intentional
upon the decision makers’ choice to allow the discrimination to
continue unmitigated. More than deliberate indifference, the
decision makers’ choice to allow discriminatory impacts to continue
uncorrected is just as invidious as intentional discrimination.
Similarly, if a recipient’s policies and practices have discriminatory
effects and those discriminatory effects are brought to the
125. Id. at 567.
126. Id. (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
127. Id. at 568.
128. Id.
129. According to U.S. Legal, an omission becomes an intentional act when
a person intentionally fails to take action and has knowledge of the action that
could
be
taken.
See
Intentional
Omission,
U.S.
LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/intentionalomission/#:~:text=An%20intention
al%20omision%20
is%20the,the%20item%20being%20left%20out
[https://perma.cc/KSM5-49ZW] (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
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recipient’s attention—and the policies and practices remain in place
due to a subsequent failure to mitigate—then the recipient has now
engaged in intentional discrimination.
F. A Minimum Threshold Rule for DMVs is a Win-Win for States
and Their LEP Residents
Although some states may have already developed language
access policies, 130 the adoption of a minimum threshold rule would
reduce states’ administrative burdens and provide greater access
and benefits to their LEP constituents. While the Supreme Court
has held that individuals no longer have a private cause of action
for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI, LEP persons
who do not have meaningful access to DMV services offered only in
English may still be able to allege intentional discrimination with
the right kind of evidence.131 Absent a clear set of factors from the
Supreme Court, we glean insight from several lower courts and the
DOJ to navigate a possible path forward for individuals to
successfully allege intentional discrimination claims based on
national origin. The next section of this Comment will highlight
some factors plaintiffs have argued, with varying degrees of
success, to prove intent in a post-Sandoval world.132 A minimum
threshold rule could moderate the effectiveness of these “intent”
arguments advanced in lower courts.133
II. PROVING INTENT IN A POST-SANDOVAL WORLD

Imagine an LEP person goes to their state’s DMV to apply for
a driver’s license and requests an examination in Spanish.
Assuming that the DMV does not have driver’s license
examinations in any languages other than English, the DMV
worker either offers the applicant an English-language exam or

130. See, e.g., N.Y. Exec. Order No. 26 (Oct. 6, 2011); Mass. Exec. Order No.
526 (Feb. 17, 2011).
131. See supra Section I.D.
132. Factors include disparate impact, history of state action, and
foreseeability and knowledge of discriminatory effect, among others. Pryor,
288 F.3d at 563; S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 254
F. Supp. 2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003); Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d
799, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
133. See Pryor, 288 F.3d at 569; see also Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at
805.
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does not offer one at all. As a result, the LEP applicant is unable
to successfully complete an application for a driver’s license in their
state of residence and is effectively denied meaningful access to this
important service because of the applicant’s national origin based
on language.134 The LEP patron at the DMV is “excluded from
participation” in the driver’s license program, “denied the benefits
of” the DMV’s services while similarly situated English-speaking
customers are not, and the LEP patron is subjected to national
origin discrimination because they are being treated worse than
English-speaking patrons solely because the LEP patron requires
services in a language other than English.135
Presumably, the DMV in this example would approach all
requests for non-English-language examinations similarly and
deny all LEP persons the meaningful access required by law. Each
applicant denied access could lodge a Title VI complaint with the
federal government, and in each case the state would have to take
affirmative steps toward providing meaningful access for LEP
applicants in order to avoid a possible loss of funding.136 In essence,
the DMV’s decision to deny a driver’s license examination to one
LEP person leads to a presumption that all LEP persons would be
denied meaningful access in much the same way. Ultimately, the
state would waste valuable time, energy, and resources dealing
with each instance of intentional discrimination when providing
language access to all LEP persons would be less costly and reduce
the number of future Title VI complaints. However, under
Sandoval, because the discrimination the applicant experienced

134. In this scenario, the applicant experienced the same kind of intentional
discrimination proscribed by Title VI under Sandoval. See generally Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). While a state may provide an LEP person
with an interpreter, this is not the most cost-effective measure. For example,
if an interpreter charges twenty dollars per hour (maximum) and five LEP
persons visit a DMV each day for two hours a piece, the DMV would incur
$70,000 in interpreter fees in a single year (assuming the DMV is closed fifteen
days per year for holidays, etc.). Interpreters for less common languages might
charge substantially higher rates for their services. A state might consider
these expenses to be an undue burden—and resist providing interpreters—or
pass these costs on to LEP customers. See Siddharth Khanijou, Comment,
Rebalancing Healthcare Inequities: Language Service Reimbursement May
Ensure Meaningful Access to Care for LEP Patients, 9 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE
L. 855, 873 (2005).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
136. See id. § 2000d(1).
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was not outwardly intentional, but rather due to the DMV’s policy
of providing driver’s license examinations only in English, the
result is a disparate impact on non-English-speaking customers.137
The LEP applicant in the example likely would not have any direct
evidence that the DMV engaged in intentional discrimination
forbidden under Section 601.138 Even if the DMV gave assurances
that it would not engage in disparate impact discrimination
pursuant to regulations promulgated under Section 602, the
applicant would not have a cause of action.139
To contend with Sandoval, each state should enhance
protections for LEP persons seeking DMV services through the
adoption of a minimum threshold rule that would: (1) guarantee
LEP persons consistent meaningful access to DMV services as the
state is the primary provider of these important services; (2) help
states foresee DMV service disruptions to LEP communities and
take proactive measures to prevent such disruptions before they
happen; (3) reduce administrative and budgetary burdens through
improved planning and a reduction in interpreter and litigation
expenses; and (4) provide greater certainty as to which DMV
services are readily available in languages other than English for
LEP customers.140
The rule would require state DMVs to provide all services and
materials for language groups whose percentage of the state’s
overall population meets the minimum threshold. Each state would
enforce the rule and it would provide LEP persons with a private
cause of action in state courts. States serious about codifying
prohibitions against disparate impact discrimination in these
circumstances could go one step further and declare that if the DMV
violates the minimum threshold rule then that violation could serve
as proof of intent for a private cause of action for intentional
discrimination under Title VI.
LEP persons subjected to
discrimination would then be able to file a formal complaint with
the federal government and possibly litigate a claim for intentional
discrimination based on national origin.

137.
138.
139.
140.

See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 275.
See § 2000d(4).
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 282.
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 321C-3.
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A. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Guarantee
Consistent Meaningful Access to DMV Services for a Vast Majority
of LEP Persons
Meaningful access does not exist for LEP persons when DMVs
do not provide services in languages other than English across all
service channels.141 The DOJ’s guidance for implementation of EO
13166—which mandates recipients of federal financial assistance
develop and implement affirmative measures to provide
meaningful access to LEP persons—suggests recipients consider
the “number or proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or
likely to be encountered by the program or grantee.”142 For
example, supplying interpreters may provide LEP persons with
meaningful access in the moment, but this measure may fail to
provide the same level of access for LEP persons seeking services
online, over the phone, or through the mail.
EO 13166 states that if a recipient fails to implement a
language access policy, then it could be found in violation of Title
VI’s disparate impact regulations and might put the recipient’s
federal funding at risk of being revoked.143 The “number or
proportion of LEP persons eligible to be served or likely to be
encountered”144 by a state’s DMV is almost one-hundred percent
because a driver’s license or state ID is often required in many
aspects of daily life, such as banking, employment, transportation,
travel, and more.145 In fact, since driver’s licenses and state IDs
141. Here, “all service channels” includes oral, print, and digital
instructions, information, and services. Under the proposed rule, DMVs would
also be required to provide interpreters for the road test portion of all LEP
persons’ driver’s license examinations.
142. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21136, at *2 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Department of
Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title
VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited
English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002)).
143. § 2000d(1).
144. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. at
41,459.
145. Minor children may not need any DMV services, but they will certainly
need DMV services once they reach the minimum age required for a driver’s
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expire, many LEP persons will require DMV services more than
once in their lifetimes. However, when application materials,
official communications, and employee assistance are provided only
in English, LEP persons are effectively denied the benefits of a
driver’s license or state ID and excluded from being able to
participate equally in DMV programs.146
Foreseeability and knowledge of the disproportionate burden
placed on LEP persons compared to their English-speaking
neighbors are also factors in whether a recipient is providing
meaningful access to its programs and activities.147 In South
Camden Citizens in Action, the plaintiffs based their Title VI claim,
in part, on the “knowledge of the impact of a facially neutral
policy.”148 The district court denied the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Protection’s motion to dismiss, finding that the
plaintiffs’ alleged facts, if proven true, showed “that the [defendant]
was well-aware of the potential disproportionate and
discriminatory burden placed upon that community and failed to
take measures to assuage that burden.”149 The district court found
the Supreme Court and Third Circuit’s precedents clearly stated
“that a case of intentional discrimination is often based upon the
type of circumstantial evidence which the SCCIA150 Plaintiffs
allege[d] . . . namely, disparate impact, history of the state action,
and foreseeability and knowledge of the discriminatory onus placed
upon the complainants.”151
license. Almost every LEP person will need DMV services at some point in
their life.
146. See Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 800–01 (N.D. Ohio
2003).
147. Id. at 806; S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
254 F. Supp. 2d 486, 497 (D.N.J. 2003).
148. Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 806; see S. Camden Citizens in Action,
254 F. Supp. 2d at 489. In this case, the residents of a mostly minority
community sued to enjoin construction of a cement grinding facility, which,
plaintiffs claimed, would have a disparate impact on the residents of their
community in violation of Title VI. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp.
2d at 489.
149. Id. at 497.
150. The district court used this initialism for “South Camden Citizens in
Action.” Id. at 489.
151. Id. at 497 (citing Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 465
(1979); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267
(1977); Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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Without question, meaningful access to services for LEP
persons is severely limited when DMVs provide materials,
applications, and services only in English. Therefore, it is likely
that LEP customers will lodge complaints—whether formally or
informally—and put offending DMVs across the country on notice
that their conduct has a disproportionate effect on LEP
customers.152 It is feasible, then, that a court may find a DMV’s
decision not to provide services in other languages in the absence of
formal complaints is mere pretext for willful and intentional
discrimination based on national origin.153 “The Supreme Court
. . . has recognized that ‘disproportionate impact is not the sole
touchstone of invidious discrimination,’” but disproportionate
impact “is often probative of why the action was taken in the first
place since people usually intend the natural consequences of their
actions.”154
States might argue that it would be difficult to provide
meaningful access to each DMV service in every language spoken
within a state’s borders because of cost or other seemingly practical
reasons. To mitigate states’ concerns here, a minimum threshold
rule would require that a language minority must reach a specific
threshold percentage of a state’s overall population before the state
is required to provide all DMV materials and services in a given
language.155 This threshold could be as low as one-tenth of one
percent and still only encompass a small number of languages other
than English. For example, in its Title VI Program report
submitted in 2018, the Rhode Island Public Transit Authority
identified only seven languages other than English that were
spoken by more than one-tenth of one percent of the state’s

152. See Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *19 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015) (despite no formal
complaints filed, defendant knew complaints had been threatened and
requests were made to take driver’s license examinations in other languages).
153. See id.
154. S. Camden Citizens in Action, 254 F. Supp. 2d at 495–96 (citing Pryor,
288 F.3d at 563); see Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21136, at *17.
155. In Faith Action for Community Equity, Hawaii used U.S. Census
Bureau data from 2006 to identify the percentage of the state’s population that
did not speak English well or at all in order to determine into which languages
the state should translate its driver’s license examinations. 2015 LEXIS
21136, at *7.
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population.156 Setting a threshold percentage would ensure that
DMVs provide the requisite meaningful access to a vast majority of
their LEP patrons. The rule would still provide meaningful access
on an as-needed basis for languages that fall below the minimum
threshold.
B. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Encourage
States to Take Proactive Measures to Avoid Foreseeable Service
Disruptions for LEP Persons
In its EO 13166 guidance, the DOJ indicates recipients should
also consider the “frequency with which LEP individuals come into
contact with” their services when recipients develop policies to
ensure meaningful access for LEP persons. 157 When LEP persons
consistently require a recipient’s services and are repeatedly denied
meaningful access, there is a history of discriminatory state action
not merely “in spite of,” but rather “because of” non-Englishspeaking individuals’ membership in a protected class. 158 The
Supreme Court has said that disparate impact “is not irrelevant”159
and that when there is no plausible, neutral explanation for a
statute’s discriminatory impact, the “impact itself would signal that
the real classification made by the law was in fact not neutral.”160
156. R.I. PUB. TRANSIT AUTH., RIPTA TITLE VI PROGRAM 7 2018-2021 (2018),
https://www.ripta.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/title_vi_program_2018_2021_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9CW-VGA4]. Rhode Island’s total LEP population is
approximately 84,295 out of a state population of just over one million (8.4%).
Id. The language breakdown of the total LEP population was as follows:
Spanish (57.6%); Portuguese (14.1%); French (7.3%); Mandarin Chinese
(3.6%); Cambodian (2.3%); Laotian (2%); Italian (1.6%); and Other (11.5%). Id.
157. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg.
41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002).
158. Pryor, 288 at 567-68. See also Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *14. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that
“violations of equal protection and Title VI require similar proofs—plaintiffs
must show that actions of the defendants had a discriminatory impact, and
that defendants acted with intent or purpose to discriminate based upon
plaintiffs’ membership in a protected class.” Id. (quoting Comm. Concerning
Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2009)).
159. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977).
160. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136, at *16.
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Taking the Supreme Court’s reasoning one step further, it is
reasonable to conclude that if the discriminatory impact of a DMV’s
policies on LEP persons cannot be plausibly explained on neutral
grounds, then the policies’ impact would indicate that the real
reason they were created was not neutral. Such evidence creates a
history of state action not of mere indifference, but of purposeful
discrimination.
In FACE, Hawaii Chief District Court Judge Susan Oki
Mollway explained that “[p]urposeful discrimination ‘implies more
than . . . intent as awareness of consequences.’”161 “‘It implies that
the decision maker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.’”162 The plaintiffs in that case
showed that the Hawaii Department of Transportation (HDOT)
“knew it had administered [four thousand] exams in various
languages in 2007 in the City and County of Honolulu alone,” and
that HDOT “knew that translating [the driver’s license exam]
would have involved minimal time and resources.”163 Judge
Mollway concluded that under these circumstances, a jury could
“reasonably infer from the delay between 2008 and 2014 that the
state intended to discriminate against various national origins,
foreseeing the disparate impact” on LEP persons.164 Similarly,
courts in other states could infer that when a DMV is aware of the
discriminatory impact of its policies—and could easily course
correct without any undue burden but declines to do so—the DMV’s
discrimination may in fact be intentional. 165
161. Id. at *15 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
162. Id. at *15–16 (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (1979)). In fact, the
court could consider several factors to determine whether the HDOT engaged
in intentional discrimination based on national origin, including:
(1) statistics demonstrating a “clear pattern unexplainable on grounds
other than” discriminatory ones, (2) “[t]he historical background of the
decision,” (3) “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up to the
challenged decision,” (4) the defendant’s departures from its normal
procedures or substantive conclusions, and (5) relevant “legislative or
administrative history.”
Id. at *17–18 (quoting Pac. Shores Props., L.L.C. v. City of Newport Beach, 730
F.3d 1142, 1158−59 (9th Cir. 2013)).
163. Id. at *19.
164. Id.
165. See generally id.
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Similarly, the plaintiffs in Almendares alleged that Ohio and
Lucas County purposefully discriminated against LEP persons
when the defendants “chose to continue a policy of failing to ensure
bilingual services and knowing that Spanish-speaking applicants
and recipients of food stamps were being harmed as the
consequence.”166 The plaintiffs alleged they were “harmed—either
by benefits being delayed or changed—because they could not
understand the English-language materials.”167 The district court
reasoned that if the plaintiffs’ claims were true, “one could logically
infer that the policy was implemented and [was] being continued
‘because of’ its impact on national origin.”168
The defendants in FACE and Almendares engaged in informed
decision-making that purposely denied meaningful access to LEP
persons similarly situated to their English-speaking peers on the
basis of national origin.169 In the same way a DMV knows its
customers (the residents of the state), it knows or can easily find
out the percentage of the population that does not speak English
well or at all, and interacts with LEP persons on a regular basis.
Adoption of a minimum threshold rule would benefit states because
it would provide a clear benchmark for when DMVs are required to
provide permanent access across all service channels in specific
languages.
C. Adoption of a Minimum Threshold Rule Would Ensure States,
as the Primary Providers of Critical DMV Services, Provide Equal
Access for LEP Persons
DMVs provide undeniably important services. 170 In its EO
13166 guidance, the DOJ identified “the nature and importance of
the program, activity, or service provided by the program to people’s
lives” as a key factor for recipients’ consideration as they develop
and put in place “a system by which LEP persons can meaningfully
166. Almendares v. Palmer, 284 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2003).
167. Id. at 807.
168. Id. at 808.
169. See Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21136, at
*16–18; Almendares, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
170. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 508 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding a
lack of driver’s licenses adversely impacts individuals via lost economic
opportunities, social services, and overall quality of life), rev’d on other
grounds, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001).

154 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:123
access those services.”171 This will ensure the “programs and
activities [the DMV] normally provide[s] in English are accessible
to LEP persons and thus do not discriminate on the basis of national
origin in violation of [T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, and its implementing regulations.”172
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Title VI regulations
state that “[d]ecisions by a Federal, state, or local entity to make an
activity compulsory, such as requiring a driver to have a license,
can serve as strong evidence of the importance of the program or
activity.”173 Thus, each state should be obligated to provide
materials, communications, and services in a variety of languages.
A driver’s license is often essential for transportation. Without one,
an LEP person may be unable to get to work, making it that much
more difficult to put food on the table and provide for their family.
A driver’s license or state ID is necessary to complete employment
forms.174 A valid government-issued photo ID is required to get on
an airplane for both domestic and international travel. A person
may be required to show ID to purchase beer or wine at a liquor
store or buy a pack of cigarettes at a gas station. Some of these
reasons may be more serious than others, but LEP persons would
be denied the benefits and enjoyment of each of these liberties if
they do not have meaningful access to the means of exercising these
freedoms.
LEP persons ought to be able to go to a state’s DMV, complete
an application, and receive services in a language that they
understand. LEP patrons should be able to visit a DMV’s website
and navigate its offerings in the comfort of their own home without
the use of a translator. An LEP person’s driver’s license should not
expire because the notice they received in the mail was in a
language they did not understand. The failure to provide services
in languages other than English—when DMVs are fully aware that
171. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg.
41,455, 41,459 (June 18, 2002).
172. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 11, 2000).
173. Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited
English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087, 74,092 (Dec. 14, 2005).
174. One could also use a U.S. passport, but it would likely be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to apply for one without first obtaining a valid stateissued form of identification.
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thousands of LEP customers walk through their doors each year—
purposefully denies LEP persons the benefits of important services
necessary to live in the United States.
It is intentional
discrimination based on national origin in direct violation of Title
VI.175 As the primary provider of DMV services, implementation of
a minimum threshold rule would ensure that states are able to meet
the needs of a vast majority of LEP constituents.
D. A Minimum Threshold Rule Will Reduce Administrative Cost
Burdens and Provide Greater Certainty for States and their LEP
Residents
After the federal government, state governments are in the
best position and have the most resources available to develop and
implement policies and practices that would provide LEP persons
meaningful access to DMV services. EO 13166 encourages
recipients to “develop and implement a system” to improve access
to services for LEP persons but “without undu[e] burden[ ].”176 In
other words, when effectuating the EO’s goals, the strain on a
recipient’s available resources matters only if its LEP improvement
plan places too great a burden on the recipient’s “fundamental
mission.”177 States might argue additional costs are a sufficient
burden to warrant noncompliance. However, recipients risk
making this argument in bad faith because of the relatively
inexpensive costs of making meaningful improvements.
In FACE, HDOT did not offer driver’s license examinations in
languages other than English between 2008 and 2013.178 Because
the State of Hawaii was a recipient of federal financial assistance,
HDOT was required to provide meaningful access to services for
LEP persons.179 After conducting surveys and meeting with
community members, HDOT requested funding to translate its
most recent driver’s license examination into twelve languages

175. See discussion supra Section I.E.
176. Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. at 50,121.
177. Id.
178. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity v. Hawaii, No. 13-00450, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21136, at *2–10 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015).
179. Id. at *6.
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besides English.180 HDOT’s request noted the approximate cost of
translating the examination was six hundred dollars per
language.181 States might argue that six hundred dollars per
language is burdensome on tight administrative budgets. However,
the DOJ’s guidance mentions undue burdens on “small businesses,
small local governments, [and] small nonprofits.”182
State
governments clearly do not fall within any of the categories
mentioned by the DOJ.
Six hundred dollars likely represents a significant cost savings
for states compared to costs they would incur for interpreters for
each LEP person’s visit to the DMV. The translations are also more
affordable than litigating potentially countless intentional
discrimination claims each year and risking future federal funding
entirely simply because the DMV did not have exams in languages
other than English. Using data from the annual American
Community Survey, DMVs can forecast which language minority
groups would reach the state’s established threshold percentage
requirement for DMV services and budget for those changes in
advance which would provide states with some budgetary
certainty.183
In addition, a minimum threshold rule will create more
certainty for LEP persons because they would know in advance
whether services will be available in their language. Conversely,
language minority groups whose percentage of a state’s overall
population falls below the established minimum threshold would
know in advance that services in their language are not readily
available and arrangements with the DMV must be made in
advance. However, under a minimum threshold rule most LEP
persons would be assured that their state’s DMV provides services

180. Id. at *10. Beginning on March 17, 2014, Hawaii’s driver’s license
examination was offered in Chinese, Chuukese, English, Hawaiian, Ilocano,
Japanese, Korean, Marshallese, Samoan, Spanish, Tagalog, Tongan, and
Vietnamese. Id.
181. Id.
182. Department of Justice Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin
Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. Reg.
41,455, 41,458 (June 18, 2002) (emphasis added).
183. U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
AM.
CMTY.
SURVEY,
https://www.census.gov/history/www/programs/demographic/american_comm
unity_survey.html [https://perma.cc/QH22-W3QJ] (last visited Dec. 21, 2020).
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in their native language.184 This would not represent an undue
burden on states and such a rule is faithful to the DOJ’s guidance
and Title VI.
E. Envisioning a State-Level Minimum Threshold Rule in Action
Assume that a state provides its DMV administrators with
reliable state-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau that shows
that in 2020, eight percent (8%) of the population “does not speak
English very well.”185 Let us say the eight percent (8%) breaks
down as follows: three percent (3%) speak Spanish, two percent
(2%) speak Haitian Creole, one percent (1%) speak Arabic, twothirds of one percent (0.66%) speak Vietnamese, two-fifths of one
percent (0.4%) speak Portuguese, one-third of one percent (0.34%)
speak Mandarin, three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) speak Italian,
two-tenths of one percent (0.2%) speak Norwegian, and one-tenth
of one percent (0.1%) speak Somali. Suppose the DMV currently
provides services only in English. Assume further that LEP
persons have visited the DMV previously and have requested
services in their native languages but have effectively been denied
services because the DMV has not translated anything into
languages other than English.
Upon learning that LEP communities make up the above
proportions of the state’s population, the DMV continues to provide
driver’s license examinations only in English, which denies LEP
communities the same degree of meaningful access enjoyed by
English-speaking patrons. Here, the DMV has made an intentional
decision not to provide translated examinations, this discriminates
against LEP persons because the DMV has continued its practices
knowing full well the discriminatory consequences of its conduct.

184. In Rhode Island, for example, 86,168 residents aged five years and over
speak English less than very well. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DETAILED LANGUAGES
SPOKEN AT HOME AND ABILITY TO SPEAK ENGLISH FOR THE POPULATION 5 YEARS
AND OVER: 2009-2013 (2015). Spanish (including Spanish Creole) (50,073),
Portuguese (including Portuguese Creole) (13,063), Chinese (2,720), (French
Creole (2,367), French (including Patois, Cajun) (2,029), and Italian (1,762)
account for 72,014 or almost eighty-four percent of LEP persons in Rhode
Island. Id.
185. People that Speak English Less Than “Very Well” in the United States,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.census.gov/library/visualizations/interactive/people-that-speakenglish-less-than-very-well.html [https://perma.cc/N774-HGMA].
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This is not mere “deliberate indifference” and represents
intentional discrimination because there is no plausible
explanation on neutral grounds for the DMV’s continuation of its
discriminatory practices.186
In order to avoid complaints of intentional discrimination, and
possible litigation, the state should adopt a rule that when an LEP
community’s population rises above an established minimum
threshold percentage of the state’s overall population, the DMV
must automatically translate driver’s license and state ID
applications, provide on-call, real-time interpreting services, full
website translations, and all other services in the necessary
language. States would be granted a one-year grace period to make
these accommodations for languages that qualify under the rule.187
During this grace period, however, DMVs would be required to
cover the costs of interpreters and translators as needed in order to
incentivize timely compliance with the rule. In this example,
imagine the state adopts a threshold percentage of one-third of one
percent (0.33%), or two-thousand individuals, whichever is less.
Here the DMV must make the above-mentioned language access
improvements for Spanish, Haitian Creole, Arabic, Vietnamese,
Portuguese, and Mandarin-speaking LEP patrons because these
language groups comprise more than the state-established
threshold.
Presumably the DMV would be less likely to encounter
someone who speaks Italian, Norwegian, or Somali than someone
who speaks Spanish or Arabic. Under the proposed rule, the DMV
would not be obligated to make all of the same improvements for
language minority groups that fall below the established threshold
percentage. Therefore, Italian, Norwegian, and Somali speakers
would have to make arrangements for language accommodations in
advance (the DMV is still obligated to provide meaningful access
under Title VI).188 These language accommodations would differ in
that the DMV would be required to translate materials and provide
interpreter services only for the specific purpose of the LEP person’s
186. Faith Action for Cmty. Equity, No. 13-00450 2015 U.S. Dist. WL
751134 at *6 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2015).
187. Using data from the most recent American Community Survey, DMVs
would be able to anticipate whether a specific language group is likely to reach
(or fall below) the state’s qualifying threshold in the coming year or two.
188. This is based on the assumption that none of these language groups
consist of more than two-thousand individuals.
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visit. However, this minimum threshold rule would cover a large
majority of states’ LEP persons while also being mindful of limited
resources.
If a language minority’s population reaches the
established threshold in subsequent years, the DMV could request
or earmark resources in anticipation of the need to make the
requisite language access improvements within the one-year grace
period.
CONCLUSION

In a post-Sandoval landscape, it is without question that
LEP persons currently do not have a private cause of action for
disparate impact discrimination based on race, color, or national
origin against recipients of federal financial assistance under Title
VI.189 What remains unclear is what evidence a plaintiff must
show to prove the discriminatory effects of a recipient’s conduct are
intentional and not merely the result of “deliberate indifference.”190
Absent clear guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress—and
for the reasons set forth above—each state should adopt a proposed
minimum threshold rule as a meaningful step towards codifying
prohibitions on disparate impact discrimination on a state level and
to prevent taxpayer dollars from funding the kind of invidious
discrimination that spurred passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

189. See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
190. Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2002).

